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Showing posts with label middleast. Show all posts
Showing posts with label middleast. Show all posts

Tuesday, 31 January 2012

Democrats Beaten Back by the Waves of History: Is Rapprochement with Iran a Possibility?

 Outside the American embassy after a mission to rescue hostages failed
January 20th 2012 marked the 31st anniversary of the release of the American hostages held in Iran. 52 people were held for a total of 444 days in Teheran's American embassy, as the world (ie America and its allies) -- to coin a cliche, -- 'held its breath'. In retrospect, it was a somewhat significant period of time to be 'holding one's breath'.  A botched rescue mission by the name of Operation Eagle Claw, in which eight military personnel and one Iranian were killed, buried the Democrats at the 1980 elections, when the Republicans had a landslide victory, returning them to office after the disgrace of the Watergate years.  Incumbent Ronald Reagan was set up and ready instead to welcome back the hostages when they finally returned. The hostage crisis was a symptom of the severe lack of trust between the growing opposition movement to the Shah in Iran and the western powers, who seemed to believe they had the right of sovereignty in Middle Eastern affairs, but actually showed an appalling ignorance when it came to comprehending the aspirations of its people.

Burning an effigy of Uncle Sam outside U.S. embassy in Tehran
 Despite the fact that it actually happened, revolution in Iran was far from the thoughts of the western powers. United States interference in Iranian affairs had long been resented by the predominantly shi'ite population going back at least to 1953. A a coup backed by the United States and Britain, installed Mohammed Reza Pahlavi, Shah of Iran as absolute monarch, in direct contravention to the sovereignty of the democratically elected government of Mohammed Mosaddeqq. The Shah of Iran was a Middle East strongman of my parents' generation. His position had always been  compromised by his blind adherence to the United States who were after all, responsible for his sudden influence in world affairs. He was blatantly anti-democratic and kept an autocrat's eye on what his people thought of him through a repressive domestic spy network known as the SAVAK. With the same sense of unreality that we have become used to recently, the Shah had no idea what his people really thought of him, and when the Iranian revolution happened, it came as a shock not only to the rest of the world, but also to the Shah himself.

 Decades of interference, both overt and covert,  had convinced the west that any kind of uprising to get rid of the Shah did not exist, even within the realms of possibility. Opposition to the Shah's rule within Iran was dismissed by the CIA in a report which stated only months beforehand that Persia 'was not even in a pre-revolutionary situation'. In his New Year's Eve toast in 1978 President Carter issued the immortal words, 'under the Shah's brilliant leadership Iran is an island of stability.'

An American flag set on fire by Iranian protesters
When the hostage situation emerged,  American president Jimmy Carter appeared to not grasp the seriousness of the situation, at least not to the voters at home. The hostages were returned safely, but the damage to the self-esteem of the Democrats has probably not been adequately calculated.  Domestically, the deterioration of the relationship between Iran and the United States became a political issue in the 1980's that both Democrats and Republicans used to enhance their chances of getting elected. Consequently neither party escaped with much in the way of integrity, much less public credibility.

 The Reagan  administration was plagued (at least in its second term),  by the possibility of the public finding out about a number of arms for hostages deals. Lieutenant Colonel Oliver North of the staff of the National Security Council  gave the go-ahead to take twelve million dollars from arm sales to Iran, and give the money to the contra 'freedom' fighters in Nicaragua. This was pointedly against all protestations from Reagan that he absolutely and categorically refused to negotiate with terrorists and that any arms for hostages deal was out of the question. [1]. An ongoing scandal for the Republicans with a Democrat congress to contend with, the exact role of President Reagan in the scandal was never properly delineated, and will probably never be known.

One of many spontaneous mass demonstrations against the Shah
The Concluding Observations of the Walsh Iran/Contra report state  that the Congress was unwilling to engage with a popular president and his executive in order to find out the truth. In doing so, Congress accepted the concept of a conspiracy by subordinate officers, so they could eliminate the need for the testimony of President Reagan and Vice President Bush. Congress was essentially defrauded, and was erroneously led to believe that the administration was acting within the law.  Despite a fighting, all-American  image the Republicans enjoyed promoting, Reagan's image was tainted both at home and abroad. Arms for hostages deals appeared to initiate more terrorism, and the United States could no longer claim the moral high ground against other nations who refused to make concessions to terrorists and their demands.

With a regime change in 1992, President Bill Clinton appealed to many as a progressive who would perhaps reach out to Iran in a show of  friendship (with of course the necessary conditions.) As with most centre-left parties in western democracies, the Democrats had to worry  about managing to stay in power, once they were elected. They had to tread carefully with the voters in order not to seem indifferent to matters of national security. They had to appear resourceful, and able to take the initiative when it came to protecting the country's interests abroad. Yet the bellicosity of the Republicans did not seem to work for them. They had to forge an image which enhanced their ability at making the peace, at reaching out and achieving some kind of dialogue with nations whose customs and religious beliefs were less comprehensible to them than others, in an area of the world as important economically as it was politically.

Reagan receiving the Tower Commission report c1987
Clinton was at first stolid in his refusal to negotiate with Iran issuing Executive Orders 12957 and 12959, banning all trade between the two countries.It could be questioned whether these orders were meant to stand or were merely symbolic of a president who was inexperienced in foreign affairs.  In the late 1990's an apology for the 1953 CIA coup was placed on the table and it seemed that the Democrats were on cue to resume  necessary diplomatic relations which had been revoked since the hostage crisis. However, an apology from the Iranians for the hostage crisis was not forthcoming in return. The executive orders were not rescinded but communications had at least been restored by a combination of private negotiation and a  desire to officially attempt to ease tensions between the two countries.

With a Democrat President currently in office, the rhetoric of the hawks with their itchy trigger fingers is balanced by a more prudent and rational discourse, as the United States attempts to balance national security pre-occupations with its  international responsibilities and its revisionist stance to right the wrongs of the disreputable regime that came before the current administration.  Neither political party has had much success in breaking through the institutionalised antipathy that America and Iran feel for each other. But that isn't to say that it won't happen, and in the process save the world from a confrontation that may be too dreadful to contemplate.

[1] Bob Woodward, Shadow: Five Presidents and the Legacy of Watergate, New York, Simon & Schuster, 1999, Ch. 10, p. 110.

Monday, 15 August 2011

Kept under the thumb by another second son?

Bashar al-Assad. How long can he last?

Events in the Middle East have carried on at a breakneck pace. It’s difficult to keep abreast of every single country that finds itself undergoing the upheaval of change from autocratic rule to hopefully something akin to democracy.  I’m not writing this to offer an analysis of events. There are enough knowledgeable people on the net able to provide that  for those of us who agree with their viewpoint and trust their judgment. I knew I wanted to write a post about what’s going on in Syria, and I discovered amongst other things, the country’s official web page here, and also consulted Bashar al-Assad’s profile on Wikipedia here. I’d just like to share some thoughts about what I like to call the ‘second son syndrome’, which I believe al-Assad is the product of, and note a few other second sons in history who have, for better or worse,  overcompensated for what they feel is a lack of approval from their father. This is particularly relevant  when second sons consider themselves inferior to either siblings who have died, or were born before they were, or simply received more attention  than they felt they did themselves.

I discovered upon reading the Wiki article that President Bashar al-Assad, President of Syria, and son of Hafez al-Assad, the previous President who ruled the country for 29 years, had in early life nursed no political aspirations. He  had an older brother named Basil, whom the family was grooming to take over from the father. The family’s hopes for Basil’s ascendancy to his father’s position were shattered when Basil was killed in a car accident in 1994.1 Bashar al-Assad was therefore forced by circumstance to take his brother’s place as their father’s heir apparent.  Recalled from London where he was studying ophthalmology, al-Assad joined the military academy at Homs and emerged as a colonel in 1999. He was thus baptised as next in line to the Presidency.  Assad the elder died in 2000 and his second son was voted unopposed as the next Syrian President.2 In 2007 his leadership was approved for another seven year term by a referendum in which there was no other candidate.3

 After reading this, I was immediately  reminded of the psychological profile of President George W Bush. This may not  seem so obvious and I realise that the reader deserves an  explanation. However the following is on the public record and is no secret. As a young man, George W  Bush struggled to prove himself to his father by appearing to be  a serious political player,  despite  what he viewed as discouragement from his parents, and unfavourable comparisons with his  brother Jeb. In researching this article I was surprised to discover that George is actually Jeb’s older brother. George suffered from the ‘second son’ syndrome to the extent that he acted as if he was younger than Jeb or in any case, inferior to him.4   I’m going to propose in this article that second sons, or boys who perceive themselves to be in the shadow of another sibling, appear  to be insecure.  Their authoritarianism and their quest to be thought of as great achievers, at least in the political sphere, can be a dangerous reflection of that insecurity. In nations without a tradition of democratic decision-making, this is pertinent  for those who are meant to live under their rule, take their orders or merely acknowledge them as their leader. 

I then got to thinking of the famous second sons I was aware of in history, and could come up with  a number of them. But because I am not aware of the lineage of every politician in the history of western civilisation, I’m sure there are many more that fit the description. Being an Australian of the old school, I was taught about Engish royalty and am most familiar with second sons because of the care lavished upon the lineage of the British Royal family. These came immediately to mind. Firstly, the current Queen Elizabeth’s II’s father George VI, was a second son. (Incidentally, his father George V was also a second son but for reasons of space he is beyond the scope of my discussion at the moment).

Duke of York in his WWI regalia. The future King George VI.
 It goes like this:  Edward VIII,  George VI’s older brother was the eldest son and originally  groomed to take the position of King as the official heir of his father (King George V). Unfortunately he fell in love with Wallis Simpson, and abdicated because she was an American as well as a divorcee and the public in Britain it was said,  would never accept her as  queen. The abdication of Edward VIII in December 1936 was in fact one of the most pivotal events of the twentieth century.5 

George VI, the second son,  previously the Duke of York, or Bertie as he was known,  was totally unprepared for the responsibility of being handed the position of King because of  his brother’s abdication. He had a stutter, a weak voice, and felt overwhelmed by a role he was never trained for and was  reluctant to perform. Although liked and admired by the public, older  brother Edward had a number of personal problems including his deteriorating relationship with father  George V who had not wished to see him ascend to the throne.6  When Edward  took over from his father who died in January 1936, it was clear he refused to be a mere figure-head and his independence spelled trouble.7 With powerful enemies arrayed against him after only eleven months on the throne, Edward formally abdicated on 10th December 1936. The throne was passed to the Duke of York, who was thought to be weak-willed and easily influenced.8 Whilst rumours of previous king Edward VIII’s Nazi sympathies abounded, the new King and his queen (the current Queen’s parents) were also desperate to avoid war with Germany in order that the monarchy survive events that were out of its control in Europe, even if it meant existing under Nazi occupation.9 The new king ie second son George VI, was receiving  a baptism of fire in the world of realpolitic, where it was necessary to maintain the authority of the monarchy at  a time of uncertainty at home as well as abroad. The approach of the Second Word War transformed Bertie Duke of York from a weak and ill-advised also-ran who paled in comparison to his dashing brother, into at least, a passable leader.10  But after the War it was clear that the British Empire was crumbling. The first Labour government was voted into office, and the creation of the welfare state did not bode well for the survival of British royalty.11 

George VI, despite his weak personality, was still a member of a powerful family that had no intention of getting sidelined by history. They have in fact continued to this day, propelled by a careful mixture of public relations and careful strategies to ensure their money, wealth and influence  remain intact.. I don’t know of a volume ever published which could tell  us the real story of these particular pair of siblings who had such an influence on the history of the 20th century because of the obvious rivalry and perhaps bitterness that may have existed between them. I do think however, that King George VI, despite his unsuitability for the position, suffered in the shadow of his older brother and was thus prepared for a life of defending British royalty, as well as the possibility of England being invaded by the Nazis.

Of course this is all just supposition on my part. But the patterns exist and should be discerned if they throw light on the motivations of individuals who exercise power over the rest of us, by virtue of us giving  our power away to them. The tenous political situation in Syria cannot be easily explained away I know and I’m not attempting to do that. I’m only attempting to understand what drives a leader to such lengths that he will turn on his own people  in such an inexcusable way. Perhaps it is fear that the implementation of democracy  would strip him of his authority as well as the identity he has forged for himself as President, in the shadow of a powerful and mourned figure in the shape of his late brother.

NOTES:
1. Wikipedia article; 2. ibid; 3. ibid; 4. The last sentence is my own. 5. 'War of the Windsors: A Century of Unconstitutional Monarchy; by Lyn Picknett, Clive Prince, Stephen Prior and Robert Brydon, South Yarra, Hardie Grant, 2002. 6. ibid. p. 106; 7. ibid. p. 132; 8. ibid. p. 174; 9. ibid. pp. 192-93; 10. ibid. pp. 195-198; 11. ibid. p. 250.